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I. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 General 
There is an ongoing migration into the Latin American, African and Asian 
jungles of settlers searching for a better life for themselves and their 
children. Many migrate under the aegis of government projects, as in 
Indonesia or Malaysia, but as many or more venture into the rainforest with 
no direct support. This study is about three such groups of settlers: two in 
Colombia, in the area of Caqueta and one in Northwest Ecuador, in the 
province of Esmeraldas. 
The relevance of this subject for regional planning is at least two-
fold. First of all, planners have a direct interest in population movements, 
since they are involved in the planning of the transport, communications, 
and social service networks to which citizens should have access. Secondly, 
planners have a direct interest in studying access to those economic services 
such as agricultural credit, inputs and technology, that enable settlers to 
survive and to contribute to the national economy. It is clear to us that, due 
to a series of scarcities, governments do not always provide these services. 
But other reasons for this failure - of specific interest to planners - may 
include errors in the ways priorities are set or programmes evaluated, or 
incorrect assumptions regarding the nature of the process of pioneer 
settlement. 
This section provides a framework for the analysis and explanation of 
settler behaviour, and because this is partly shaped by government policy, 
some of the most important reasons for the success or failure of such 
policies will be examined. In this regard, we make use of the recent work of 
Oberai (1986), who discusses the relative success ofland settlement policies 
in developing countries in terms of their effectiveness and efficiency. In 
sections 1.2 and 1.3 we discuss the relevance ofthese criteria to the study 
of settlement policies; section 1.4 covers settler motivation and behaviour 
and the conditions that shape this behaviour; and section 1.5 sets forth 
hypotheses arising from this approach to land settlement analysis and 
assessment. The analytical framework described in section 1.4 is used to 
examine three new land settlements: one in Ecuador and two in Colombia. 
Note: This research was financed by the Netherlands Department of International 
, Cooperation under the ILPES/ISS project. This paper summarizes the research reports 
of Eduardo Durand (l981a and b). 
1.2 Effectiveness 
Government policies in. the field of new land settlement serve vari()lls 
objectives, ranging from increasing agricultural production through 
ensuring established national borders, to avoiding or decreasing rural-to-
urban migration or relieving population pressures in areas of existing 
settlements. Hiraoka (1980), in his study of the settlement of the Upper 
Amazon, makes it clear that over the past 40 years in East Bolovia all these 
objectives played a role. Sometimes a number of goals were pursued 
simultaneously, or new objectives were mentioned in defence of continued 
government expenditure for settlement projects. In addition, changes in 
external economic conditions or changes in governmental ideology have 
caused serious ups and downs in sums allocated for new settlements. The 
same phenomena can be observed in Ecuador, Peru and Colombia. 
These shifts in the bureaucratic and political environment of new 
land settlement projects make it very difficult, if not impossible, to judge 
the effectiveness of settlement policies in terms of their stated objectives. 
The process of new land settlement takes at the very least a period of about 
10 years and evaluation studies should cover a similar period, but it is nearly 
impossible to find a decade-long stretch in which objectives remained stable 
or funds were forthcoming in accordance with original plans. 
It is not always clear who or what should be included in evaluative 
studies of settlement policies. No doubt the evaluation of directed 
settlements must consider the criteria by which people who arrived in 
government-constructed schemes are selected, the credit and extension 
programmes - all in the context of the crop selection done for the settlers, 
the layout of villages, the type of housing and so on. But whether and how 
penetration roads should be taken into account is not always clear. These 
are sometimes built in connection with mineral resource development (e.g. 
oil) as was the case in East Ecuador, where a directed settlement project was 
developed after the road was constructed. Further complications arise from 
the fact that directed settlement projects are almost always accompanied 
by spontaneous settlement, making it difficult to determine where a study 
of settlement policy effectiveness should begin or end. 
Oberai (1986) identifies six objectives ofland settlement policies: 
population redistribution, development of border areas, provision of land 
to landless people, regional development, agricultural development and 
improved welfare of migrants. Dunham mentions similar objectives, but 
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adds thst in the evaluation of settlement policies researcherrs have tended 
'to view "political factors" as an external influence (disrupting the 
adequate planning of settlement schemes), rather than as an integral part 
ofthe planning process itself' (Dunham, 1982: 46-7). Oberai concludes that 
land settlement programmes: 
so far ... have made no more than a modest contribution to the 
solution of the problems of populations distribution, unemploy-
ment and poverty. Very few programmes have reached their stated 
objectives (1986: 158). 
Dunham concludes that: 
it is not sufficient to focus on the success or failure of settlement 
projects as phenomena apart, divorced from their historical and 
political context, and thatit may not be enough simply to assess them 
in terms of their stated objectives (1982: 58). 
In his evaluation of settlement programmes, Oberai rightly points to the 
need to consider settlement projects in their regional context, arguing that 
planning should take account of the dynamics in the life of such projects: 
second-generation problems could then be avoided and off-farm 
employment more easily generated. Thus, Oberai focuses on the need to 
look at the internal economic and demographic dynamics of settlement 
projects, while Dunham addresses himself to the external political dyna-
mics. 
Helmsing (1982) in turn considers external economic dynamics: the 
importance of profitable production in existing settlements for the 
development of agriculture in new settlements. For example, he shows how 
cattle farming in older settlements in Colombia was replaced with cotton 
growing, rice farming and sugar production, allowing cattle farming to 
become feasible in new areas. 
This crucial aspect of crop selection has often been overlooked, so 
that quantities of labour and other resources were wasted in directed 
settlement projects. Although it seems only marginally related to 
government objectives, it is of eminent importance to the motivation of 
settlers deciding whether to remain in a settlement area. 
Oberai, Dunham and most other scholars in this field implicitly 
assume that settlers, especially pioneers (the first arrivals in an area), are 
resolved to remain, and that desertion is a sign of failure. Helmsing 
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disagrees. In his view (and in ours) a certain proportion of settlers, especially 
in government-sponsored schemes, consider their land-clearing labour as 
a way to c_reat~ savings, which are realized by selling the pioneer plot. These 
savings are then available for investment in another new land settlement or 
in their village of origin. 
1.3 Efficiency 
Nelson (1973) and others have made it clear that the rate of return on capital 
invested in government-directed settlement projects in Latin America is 
either very low or negative. There is some evidence from other countries, 
especially Malaysia, that such poor performance is unnecessary, but in 
practice it appears that low returns on capital should be assumed. 
Although we do not wish to remake all existing studies using a dif-
ferent methodology, nor to praise governmental performance in the field 
of settlement programmes, it appears justified to question the results of 
these studies on methodological grounds. This is directly related to the 
question of what should be included in policy evaluation studies. Section 
1.2 refers to inputs: housing and sewerage systems, the penetration road, 
the clearing of forest by spontaneous settlers outside the pre-defined limits 
·ofthe scheme. There are also problems of definition on the output side. Is 
'income' only that income generated by settlers on land developed under 
the scheme, or must the income generated by additional settlers on lands 
outside the scheme's boundaries, together with the value of the infra-
structure they create on their own initiative, be taken into account? 
Just as all analyses are effected by the definitions used to include or 
exclude data, the assumptions underlying the calculation of a project's 
internal rate of return can mislead. Common assumptions include the 
settler's ability to grow the pre-selected crops, the prices that are obtainable 
for .output, the price of inputs, the availability of credit and of extension 
services, good transport facilities to markets and last but not least, the 
settler's commitment to remain in the settlement. 
The organization and implementation of settlement schemes to a 
large extent attempts to create conditions that reflect the planner's 
assumptions, and Bunker gives an interesting summary of what happened 
in Brazil in this regard: 
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These agencies also transferred the goals, the procedures, and the 
technologies appropriate to the economy and ecology of the centre 
- south to their operations in the Amazon. Becaus.e of their 
emphasis on agricultural credit, and their orientation to 
commercialization, there was little interest in the improvement of 
subsistence crops and strategies, although health instruction -
primarily focussed on 'sanitation - was stressed (1985: 105). 
Hence, in designing these projects, planners tended to overlook the basic-
ally primitive circumstances surrounding new land settlements. A 
comparative statics approach appears to dominate, while essential elements 
such as production for subsistence tend to be forgotten. How one gets from 
year zero to the year in which all is fine appears to receive Iittlethought from 
planners, so that the process of settlement proper lacks considered planning 
and attention. Again, therefore, we are faced with the problem of adequat-
ely taking settler motivation into account. In addition to being one aspect 
of understanding settlement processes, settler motivation is relevant to the 
evaluation of the man-made conditions that go into planned settlement 
schemes. 
1.4 Settler motivation and behaviour 
For Mougeot (1985) migration to the agricultural frontier in Brazil is part 
of a displacement process that implies the 'escape' of labour-intensive, 
traditional and low-return activities to less contested areas. In his view, this 
process is mostly fed by spontaneous settlers who are able to survive - be 
it at low levels of income - as long as commercial agriculture and associated 
government services remain at a distance. However, once these penetrate 
frontier areas, such pioneers tend to be displaced. 
Moran (1985:97) reports that throughout Spanish-speaking Latin 
America the rates of attrition from colonization projects are even more 
discouraging than in Brazil: 
Rates as high as 95 per cent have been reported in the first three years 
of the Alto Beni of Bolivia, 60 per cent in Santa Cruz de 
Bolivia ... [due to] .. .lack of all-weather roads, lack of basic health 
and educational services and insecurity of title. 
5 
Obviously, what Moran concludes to be the causes of desertion may contain 
some truth -even a great deal of it - but he provides no proof. Mougeot' s 
'escape' hypotQt!sisisjnteresting and mayhe_closeto_thetme motivation 
of a number of settlers, but again, it is not based upon direct motivation 
studies. Paradoxically, while Mougeot says that desertion will increase with 
the advent of good roads and government services, Moran says that deser-
tion is motivated by their absence. The seeming contradiction arises because 
Mougeot refers to spontaneous settlers of the pioneer type, while Moran 
speaks of settlers in government-sponsored schemes. While both may have 
similar motivations, the latter may have quite different expectations. Those 
who decide to conquer the jungle on their own - the true pioneers - must 
have a mental make-up that differs from that of those who expect the 
protection of a government-sponsored scheme. 
There is a second aspect to the two findings that requires some 
attention: both authors refer to the incorporation into the national eco-
nomy of agricultural production on the frontier. In fact, new land sett-
lement constitutes the spatial expansion of all national economic, socio-
political and administrative systems. We cannot a priori assume the 
dynamics of each of these systems to be the same, and it seems reasonable 
to expect that they will differ in directed, semi-directed and spontaneous 
settlements. The motivations and expectations of settlers in each of these 
types of settlement may be expected to differ, and the nature of the various 
processes of incorporation ought logically to be influenced by these 
differences. Policies related to incorporation must therefore adequately 
take these differences into account. 
The present study considers two aspects of incorporation: it at-
tempts to obtain insights into the motivation of settlers by studying their 
strategies from the moment of arrival, and it examines the impact upon 
settler behaviour of some aspects of economic incorporation. 
We start from the idea that settlers have certain characteristics in 
terms of the resources they have at their disposal; labour, capital and 
technology, the latter especially in relation to its appropriateness for the 
agro-climatic zone in which they settle. Armed with these resources, they 
will try to reach their objective, which we assume to be a higher level ofliving 
than they had in their areas of origin. Hence, settlement in another area may 
only be of instrumental value for a number of them: they may wish to return 
to their area of origin to buy the land 'they always wanted to own'. Similarly, 
to settle definitely on the first plot they obtain in a new land settlement area 
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may not be consistent with their final objective, i.e. a higher standard of 
living. In the same way that a salaried person might migrate in order to 
increase income, a settler may wish to move on to what is perceived as a 
better opportunity. 
In making this type of decision, settlers are constrained by the nat-
ural conditions ofthe settlement area, by man-made conditions and by the 
attributes they possess. Four attributes appear to be of eminent importance: 
a) the number oflabour units available to the household; b) the amount of 
capital the household can command; c) the knowledge of agricultural 
technology relevant to the area of settlement; and d) the social abilities of 
the household. This last attribute is related to the importance of a settler's 
ability to organize for common tasks and to represent settler interests in 
government circles. Most Andean governments will deal with cooperatives 
or associations of spontaneous settlers, but not with individuals. In 
spontaneous settlements in particular, this attribute is of great importance 
if health or other services are to be obtained. But even in directed 
settlements, the organization of settlers is important for dealings with 
government agencies. The relevance of the other attributes appears ob-
vious. 
The behaviour of equally equipped settlers within the same settle-
ment may differ, depending on their motivation, the most important factor 
being whether they plan to stay permanently or are working the land in order 
to establish themselves elsewhere. We may assume that the behaviour of 
settlers who are intending to stay will be very similar, as long as man-made 
and natural conditions are virtually equal for all. 
Conditions within the same settlement may not be the same, how-
ever. The problem of access to water in new land settlement schemes 
combined with irrigation schemes is of course very well known. In the cases 
discussed in this paper, other natural conditions, such as soil quality, can 
also differ significantly within the same settlement. 
Man-made conditions include the layout ofthe settlement, which 
has a direct bearing upon access to social and centrally located services and 
transport facilities, and upon the granting of preliminary and formal title, 
the availability of production and investment credit, the cost of such credit 
(interest rates), the availability and price of inputs, the arra~gements for 
marketing and so on. 
Man-made conditions will generally be the same for all settlers, al-
though within a given settlement differences in plot location may influence 
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settler behaviour, since settlers located on the outskirts of a large scheme 
may be too far from central services such as primary schools. For example, 
assuming that soil and climate indicate that farms of 50 to 100ha are need(!c1 
to provide a reasonable family income (as is the case in many Amazonian 
areas) then farming families will be greatly dispersed: no more than two 
families per square km. In a similar situation in Ecuador (Wood, 1972: 616) 
where 'travel within a cooperative is on foot or on horseback, it is almost 
impossible for a community centre to function efficiently. Only 100 families 
willli ve within the four-kilometer radius which mar ks approximately one 
hour's travel time from the centre'. Thus people located more than four 
kilometres from the centre may decide to resettle elsewhere, the more so if 
their plot will fetch agood price. This argument is summarized in figure 1. 
Man-made 
conditions Settler behaviour 
Natural 
conditions 
Figure 1: Assumed basic determinants of settler behaviour. 
This argument does not sufficiently take into account the attitude a settler 
may have towards settling on new land. Among otherwise equal settlers, 
it is possible (and in both spontaneous and directed settlement areas in the 
Amazon basin even likely) to observe at least two attitudes toward 
settlement: 'stayer-attitudes' and 'mover-attitudes'. Evaluations of 
settlement projects generally attach great importance to the percentage of 
stayers observed in a settlement, and are unable to locate sufficient data on 
settlers who move, because they are unavailable for interview. Did they 
always intend to leave, or did conditions force them out in search of better 
opportunities? 
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In addition, as Helmsing (1982) explains, the mover attitude may 
develop through a learning process that implies at least the following 
characteristics. The combination of soil quality and the maximum plot size 
for pioneers may indicate that the resulting settler farms cannot be 
economically viable. At the same time, other and often richer people have 
learned that land in settlement areas can be obtained in various ways and 
that the value of such land tends to increase over time. New land settlements 
are thus subject to speculation, and speculators have discovered ways to 
obtain land rights without actually ever living on it. These plots are cleared 
by stewards or by transient pioneers, the real 'movers', who also know that 
land values rise. Thus speculators support the ambition of movers, and the 
need to consolidate undersized plots into viable farms creates a supply of 
land both for speculators and for a second wave of capital owning stayers. 
Settler behaviour has to be studied within this framework of addit-
ional forces. 
Keeping this in mind, we now discuss in more detail the effects of 
man-made and natural conditions upon settler behaviour. From the point 
of view of new land settlement planning, two aspects of the settler behav-
iour appear to be of special importance: a) the speed at which the land is 
cleared, and b) whether the settlers stay in the settlement. The stayer who 
arrives as a pioneer will start to clear an area ofland sufficient for satisfying 
the subsistence needs ofthe household. Since stayers all tend to do this, the 
market prices for subsistence crops will generally be too low to warrant their 
marketing. Sending the produce to other markets will generally be 
economically unattractive because of the high transport costs involved. 
As long as cash crops (cattle, tree crops) do not yield, a consider-
able shortage of cash will exist in the settlement area, and in order to buy 
needed goods and services, members of stayer households will probably 
seek work outside their plot. In general, stayers tend to insist on the supply 
of social services - health and education for their children - and on the 
improvement of transport systems. They will also be interested in con-
structing good quality dwellings and other buildings. The more expensive 
'imported' products are, the more time the stayers will have to spend off 
their farms, so that they have less time to clear their own land, and less 
cleared land available for cash crops. Other things being equal, if natural 
fertility ofthe land is high, stayers will need to clear and plant fewer hectares 
for cash crops than if fertility is low. However, where a marketing 
organisation for settlers exists, land clearance need not be as advanced, 
9 
since the better market structure will tend to increase the value added per 
acre. The higher and more stable income obtainable in such a situation once 
thecashcrops-yieldsufficientlyandthemarket-hasstabilizedrelievessettlers-
from the need to obtain cash income by working outside their own plots, 
allowing them more time to devote to clearing land. 
Hence stayers tend to clear more land the higher the wage rate outside 
the settlement, the more investment credit available to substitute for wage 
income, the better the cash crop mar keting system, the less fertile the land, 
and the more labour and capital available to the household. 
Movers, on the other hand, while they are undifferentiated from 
stayers with regard to subsistence crops, tend to devote more time to land 
clearance even if they are uninterested in growing cash crops. Movers are 
more likely to be found in areas where the plot size available to a pioneer 
is below that of a viable farm. It is obvious that this proposition needs to 
be tested by comparing behaviour in a number of settlement areas, since 
fertility and plot size are generally similar within a single area. As already 
noted, this is generally also the case for man-made conditions, with the 
exception of proximity to centrally located services. 
Meanwhile, man-made conditions, e.g. credit, marketing, transport 
and social services, partly define the way in which the activities of a new land 
settlement area are incorporated into the country's economy. Clearly, a 
stayer may become a mover if conditions become too adverse. Therefore, 
we may expect that where soils are poor there will tend to be a higher 
percentage of movers than in an area with relatively good soils. 
Nevertheless, settler households that are large and well endowed with 
capital and technology at the time of arrival will tend to be stayers if the 
aforementioned man-made conditions are favourable. 
Obviously, given the influences of natural and man-made condi-
tions upon settler behaviour, it will be very difficult to distinguish between 
stayers and movers in any given settlement without a very carefully-targetted 
survey. We consider this distinction to be very important, and although our 
survey addresses the issues involved in a rather indirect way, it has helped 
us to sort out some of the basic characteristics of stayer and mover 
behaviour. 
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1.5 Basic hypotheses on settler behaviour 
Although the present study is placed within the general analytical context 
discussed in section 1.4, it has not been possible to clarify the impact of all 
the mentioned variables, because the pertinent datais lacking. We decided 
to focus on both the impact of key natural factors on three representative 
aspects of economic incorporation: credit availability, markets for output, 
and the availability of transport facilities. All other aspects of man-made 
conditions are set aside, however important they may be. 
lt is important to specify the conditions under which economic in-
corporation takes place. One of these conditions is of course the legally 
determined size of the pioneer plot. If plots are too small to allow for a 
reasonable family income, the phase of clearing the land must necessarily 
be followed by a phase of consolidation during which some colon as leave 
the settlement. This phase will tend to come sooner the more adverse other 
conditions are. In terms of our main variable, this means that if credit is not 
available, if the market structure is monopsonistic and if transport facilities 
are poor, that the pioneer will tend to give up sooner. Since these three 
variables are basically the same for all colon as in a given settlement, their 
impact can only be studied by inter-settlement comparison. 
A second condition is given with the economic characteristics ofthe 
crop to be grown, and those of its market. If it is relatively light and non-
perishable (e.g. coffee but not cattle) it seems reasonable to assume that the 
negative impact of poor transport facilities is lessened. Similarly, if only 
live cattle are in demand, the availability of investment credit is more 
important than if tree crops can be sold relatively easily. Tree crops require 
on the whole less cash investment per hectare. Finally, although this is not 
always the case, market structures for tree crops tend to be more competitive 
than those for cattle, possibly because the initial investment for tree crops 
tends to be smaller and entry into the market is less closed to assembler/ 
traders. This second general condition of economic incorporation may be 
different for settlers in the same settlement, that is, if they are producing 
different types of products. 
These two basic conditions under which incorporation may take 
place are mutually dependent. It follows from our observations on farm 
size that some crops might become economically viable only after 
consolidation has taken place, such as when a second-wave settler with 
considerable capital buys a number of pioneer plots and forms a ranch 
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large enough for a crop (e.g. cattle) that was economically impossible for 
the small, unmoneyed, pioneer. 
This study was un_a,ble to follow the initial generations of settlf:!r:s~ 
We arrived to observe the results of a pmcess in which consolidation had 
taken place. It is thus not possible to identify the impact ofthese two basic 
conditions of incorporation with precision, but some preliminary 
conclusions seem feasible. It does appear that the following hypotheses may 
be formulated. 
i. Pioneers may be divided into two groups: stayers and movers. The 
former will tend to move on because of adverse man-made or natural 
conditions; the latter will move on within approximately five years. 
ii. All pioneers will start out by clearing an area of forest that is suficient 
to grow the family's subsistence needs; in addition, they will tend to 
seek a source of cash income in the area. 
If natural fertility is low, the clearing ofland for subsistence purposes 
will be continued and the uncultivated land can be planted with tree 
crops or sown to grass for cattle. 
iii. On highly fertile soils the turnover of settlers will be smaller than on 
poor soils, since on the latter plot consolidation will be required for 
a viable family farm. 
iv. The level of output of pioneer farms of similar size is determined by 
the number of labour units available to the household. 
v. The tendency to stay in a settlement increases with the availability 
oflabour and credit, and with the pioneer's prior knowledge of the 
production technology required for local conditions. 
On the aspect of incorporation we put forward the following hypotheses: 
vi. Within the same settlement there will be a tendency for farms of 
particular sizes to emerge; this tendency will be stronger the greater 
the gap between the legal size of a pioneer plot and the size of a viable 
family farm. 
vii. In settlements where there is demand for cash crops requiring 
relatively little investment, and that can be transported with relative 
ease, there will be a tendency for pioneers to stay longer. 
viii. The degree of monopsony as measured by the gross margin obtained 
by assembler/traders will tend to be lower for those products that 
require little investment on their part. 
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In view of the complexity of the various issues at hand, this study serves 
more as a means to generate hypotheses than as one that can arrive at 
definite conclusions. 
1.6 Outline of the study 
Sections 2 and 3 present data on three projects: one in Quininde in north-
western Ecuador, and two located in Caqueta in Eastern Colombia: 
Maguare and Valparaiso. Conclusions are offered at the end of each section, 
which are then taken up and compared in section 4, followed by a formula-
tion of the most important conclusions to be drawn from the cases. 
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Map 1: Location of Quininde and Nueva JerusaJen 
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2. THE CASE OF NUEVA JERUSALEN IN QUININDE 
2.1 Background 
Quininde is situated in the province ofEsmeraldas in northwestern Ecuador 
(see map 1). The province had a total 1980 population of250,000, and a 4 
per cent annual growth rate. Soils are of medium fertility and fairly deep. 
Altitude ranges from sea level to 400 metres and the topography is mainly 
plain to undulated. Temperature (averaging 25 degrees C) and rainfall 
(averaging 2400 mm) combined with soil fertility make the cultivation of 
perennials and pastures possible, the main crops being banana, plantain, 
African oil palm, coffee, cacao and citrus, while maize and rice are the 
subsistence crops. Existing stands of virgin forest are being exploited by 
concession holders. 
Quininde is a canton with a population of about 70,000. Over the 
past 15 years its annual growth rate was close to 9 per cent. More than 90 
per cent of the population lives in small scattered settlements and 78 per cent 
of the labour force is engaged in primary activities. The average income per 
capita is close to US $300. Infant mortality in the area is 65 per thousand, 
ilIiteracyamongpersons of9years of age and olderis 33 percent; primary 
school attendance encompasses only 60 per cent of the school-age 
population (6-12 years) and 95 per cent of the dwellings lack public water 
supplies and electricity. 
The settlement of Quininde must be seen in the context of agricult-
ural development in Ecuador, which until about 1965 was characterized by 
its susceptibility to consecutive waves of influence of the world market. The 
last of these waves occasioned the banana boom of 1955-65, which ended 
when disease forced plantation owners and smallholders alike out of 
business. The banana boom had led to a high rate ofland development in 
the Pacific provinces when wage labour and spontaneous small settlers 
flowed into the areas fit for banana production, the main variety being 
Gross Mitchell. However, when the disease struck, the areas not fit for 
growing the more resistent Cavendish variety had to be abandoned, leaving 
the people in these areas in considerable economic and social disarray. Some 
owners converted their land into pastures, others divided it among their 
workers and stilI others abandoned it and left it to invading small settlers. 
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Towards the end of the 1950s a road was opened running from 
Quito, via Santo Domingo de los Colorados, through Quininde to the 
Pacific port Gity ofEsmeraldas. During the early years of road construction 
various large enterprises received forestry concessions. By 1975 the road 
had been paved, and many small settlements could be found along it. At 
about the same time, the most important firm in the Quininde area -
Palmera de los Andes - received rights to 10,000 hectares to plant African 
oil palm, and by 1979 it occupied some 3,000 hectares. Next, the firm 
Plywood arrived, buying its timber mainly from settlers, although its 
concession amounts to 12,000 ha. CODESA, a forestry firm with a 2,000 
ha concession, also arrived in the 1970s. 
There are some 150 indigenous Cayapas families in the area, in 
addition to a second ethnic group that originated outside the city of 
Esmeraldas. The latter are largely of negro origin (morenos) and own about 
20 per cent of the holdings, these being generally smaller than 20 hectares. 
The building of the road, and the gradual opening of the area to exploitation 
and settlement, took place without seriously involving this original 
population in decision making. 
The general situation in the canton of Quininde with regard to the 
distribution of holdings according to the 1974 agricultural census is 
presented in Table 2.1. 
A comparison of Table 2.1 with Table 2.2. shows that the settlement 
of Nueva J erusalen is not typical for the canton, since it contains almost 
no holdings ofless than 20 hectares. The smallholdings go back to the era 
of the invasions of the former banana plantations, but also include the 
holdings of the original inhabitants, such as the Cayapas. 
Size of 
Holding 
0-5 
6-20 
21-50 
51-100 
101- 500 
>500 
TOTAL 
Table 2.1 . 
Distribution of land in Quininde, 1 'ii74 
Holdings (no.) Area (ha.) 
Absolute percentage Absolute percentage 
649 12.3 1294 0.6 
1072 20.5 11533 5.3 
1885 36.0 . 57728 26.3 
1246 23.8 69808 31.8 
366 7.0 60078 27.4 
22 0.4 18940 8.6 
5240 100.0 219381 100.0 
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Since 1974 the number of smallholdings has been diminishing as 
owners sell out to Palmera de los Andes and to abaca plantations situated 
along the main road. The activities of these plantations are important in 
various other ways as well, the most important perhaps being that they 
determine the wage rate forjornaieros (day workers) in the area and the price 
ofland (MAG, 1979). 
Most of the new settlers came from adjacent coastal provinces 
(Manabae, Los Rios)and have had to interact with the plantation owners, 
the wood firms, the Cayapas and the morenos. Government was present in 
the form of IERAC, the Ecuadorian Institute of Agrarian Reform and 
Settlement, which legalized the occupation of land, imposing legal 
requirements to keep holdings between 30 and 50 hectares and awarding 
preliminary ownership papers only to settlers who joined cooperatives. In 
1977 the government started a project in the Quininde area in order to 
provide assistance to the settlers (cf. OAS, 1982). 
Nueva Jerusalen is a cooperative composed of 160 owners of 
holdings. The settlement of the same name is connected to the town of 
Quininde by an unpaved road. The data below, collected in July/August 
1980, refer to this settlement. 
2.2 Settler Characteristics 
Most settlers (82 per cent) came from the province of Los Rios. Almost 70 
per cent of all settlers had previously been employed as agricultural workers, 
while 28 per cent had been small freeholders or tenants. It is noteworthy that 
68 per cent of the settlers were pioneers, that is to say first occupants. The 
process of occupation has been relatively slow: 38 per cent of all settlers 
interviewed in 1980 had been resident since 1964, and another 30 per cent 
had arrived prior to 1974. After 1974, new arrivals in the area would buy 
land from colon os who were leaving. Almost 30 per cent of the holdings 
have been p1.Jrchased, nearly all of these since 1974. 
About 18 per cent of all those interviewed in 1980 had sold their 
previous property, with about half of them becoming pioneers and the rest 
buying their Nueva Jerusalen land from pioneers. Among the pioneers, 
approximately 35 per cent came with initial capital. Among the buyers this 
percentage is slightly higher. 
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The average settler's household is rather large, with eight members. 
The reason for this is that in addition to members ofthe nuclear family, the 
ho_us.e.hold __ cPJlsjsJs_Qt~llegados_QLarrimaJLQ~, j:hl!tJsJ9_SJlY,_r~tilliY~_Q! 
friends who contribute their labour. There are five or fewer members in 23 
per cent of all households; 53 per cent have six to ten members, 21 per cent 
have eleven to fifteen members, and 3 per cent have more than fifteen 
members, the mean size of each group being 3.9, 7.8, 12.0and 17.0respec-
tively. 
In 1980, the average head of the household was 46 years of age, 
6 per cent of the heads of households being less than 30 years old and 10 per 
cent being 61 or older. The vast majority (91 per cent) said that they had 
attended primary school for at least 3 years; 55 per cent claimed 5 or 6 years 
of attendance. In summary, it can be said that at their time of arrival settlers 
were fairly young around 30 years of age, that they came mostly from 
similar climatological areas, that they had received very little education and 
that in the first years they had had opportunities to earn cash by working 
for the various companies in the area. They were all spontaneous settlers. 
2.3 The Holdings 
Holdings are located between the Blanco and Guayllabamba rivers east of 
the paved road from Quininde to Santo Domingo. Some of the holdings 
fronting both sides of a feeder road, are 250 metres wide and about 2000 
metres deep, with an area of about 50 hectares. However, a number have 
been either subdivided or consolidated, depths vary, and many are located 
away from roads or tracks (see Map 2). The distribution of holdings is given 
in Table 2.2. 
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Map 2: Original layout of plots, Cooperativa Nueva JerusaJen 
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Size of Number 
Holding abs OJo 
(ha) 
:::; 25 10 29 
26- 50 18 53 
51 -100 5 15 
>100 1 3 
TOTALS 34 100 
Table 2.2 
Number of holdings by size and main activities, 1980 
Total Area 
abs OJo 
(ha) 
250 17 
826 55 
297 20 
125 8 
1498 100 
Mean 
Area 
(ha) 
24 
46 
59 
125 
44 
Main Type of Activity 
(No. of Holdings in survey) 
Agriculture Mixed farming 
8 
10 
2 
20 
2 
8 
3 
1 
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Land-use in the settlement is shown in Table 2.3. 
Table 2.3 
Land use by size of holding, 1980 
Size Crops (ha) Pastures Total Unused 
Holding Tree Su bsistence (ha) Used (ha) ha OJo 
(ha) 
:::; 25 93.0 17.5 23.0 133.5 116.5 47 
26- 50 214.5 40.0 91.0 345.5 480.5 58 
51-100 80.1 29.0 26.0 135.1 161.9 54 
>100 39.0 1.0 35.0 75.0 50.0 40 
TOTALS 426.6 87.5 175.0 689.1 808.9 54 
The fact that so much land remains unutilized -even after 16 years 
occupation - is indicative of a number of problems in the area, as the 
following sub-sections will indicate. 
The process of occupation follows basically the following steps. 
First a holding is demarcated. Then clearing starts and, where roads exist, 
the resulting timber can be used or sold. If roads are lacking, the timber is 
not marketed and trees are cut and burnt. Once a plot has been cleared, 
maize or rice is sown at the beginning of the rainy season. As more land is 
cleared, coffee or cocoa is planted, banana or plantain trees providing a fast 
growing provisional shadow. If cattle raising is the eventual aim, the settler 
will sow grass. In both cases the aim is to have perennials, either in the form 
of treecrops or as pasture. 
Smallholders devote relatively more land to tree crops than do other 
settlers, perhaps because the relative investment (in seedlings) for cocoa and 
coffee is less than that for cattle. Cattle farmers, as beef producers, aim at 
holdings and herds that are sufficiently large to provide most of their 
income. This means that they have an interest in consolidation and in 
buying out other farmers. 
Most farmers with fewer than 25 ha plant coffee, and the produc-
tivity of these holdings is relatively low: 42.4 quintals per ha, while with 
improved technology 65 quintals per ha would easily be feasible. Cocoa is 
also produced by the smallholders, but in terms of land use it is more 
important for 26-50 ha farms. Yields, however, are higher on the small-
holds: 11.6 quintals per ha compared with 10.7 quintals per ha on the 26-50 
ha farms. 
2.4 Labour Availability and Use 
Assuming that full-time adult male farmers make available 1 labour unit 
per annum for farm work, that women (who also are responsible for 
household chores, child-rearing and other tasks) make available 0.5 labour 
units for farm work, while older children attending school make available 
0.5 units during part of the year as temporary family workers, we can 
calculate the number of permanent labour units available per holding. 
Children below the age often are assumed not to work in the farm. 
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Based on these assumptions, 60 per cent of the smallholders and 
30 per cent of the settlers having between 26 and 50 hectares have only 1.5 
family labour units available per annum. For all farms in the sample, 98 
labour units are available, or 2.88 on the average (see Table 2.4). 
Table 2.4 
Average number of permanent labour units available by 
farm size and per hectare 
permanent Labour per Hectare per Hectare 
Size (ha) Family Hired Total in Use in Farm 
:5 25 2.20 0.10 2.30 0.17 0.09 
26- 50 2.80 0.06 2.86 0.15 0.06 
51-100 3.40 0.40 3.80 0.14 0.06 
>100 6.50 2.00 8.50 0.01 0.07 
All farms 2.90 0.18 3.08 0.15 0.07 
Permanent labour is hired by 12 per cent of the settlers. Only 10 per cent 
of the smallholders, 6 per cent of the farmers with 26-50 haand 20 per cent 
of the farmers with 51-100 hectares hirelabour. The large farmers all have 
permanent hired labour. 
At least 35 per cent of the farmers hire no help at all, not even tem-
porary help, although they may be engaged in helping each other. Those 
who do hire farmhands do so for periods of one to three months, mainly 
for tasks connected with clearing land. 
Total labour availability per hectare in use is highest on the smaller 
farms where the more labour-intensive crops such as cocoa and coffee are 
grown, whereas the larger farms tend to be involved in cattle raising. 
Another point of relative importance is that 18 per cent ofthe heads 
of household have off-farm jobs, a fact that seems indicative of cash 
shortages, especially for farmers with fewer than 50 ha. 
2.5 Level of Technology 
The quality of the soils is relatively high. Although some plots have been 
in use now for close to a generation, fertility has declined only slightly. 
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Hardly any chemical fertilizers are used in the area and only 35 per cent of 
thecolonos claim to use insecticides or pesticides - these mainly for coffee. 
Even fewer (26 per cent) purchase salt, drugs or vaccines for their cattle. As 
to equipment: only three per cent of all farms use more than the basic 
machete, axes and shovels of traditional farming. Agricultural extension 
is not very active in the area, only 12 per cent of the respondents said they 
had received any attention in this regard. 
The data on use of inputs correspond to the view settlers have of their 
present problems: in 71 per cent of the holdings plant diseases were con-
sidered a serious problem. In 26 per cent of the holdings the lack of credit 
facilities was considered a problem, the lack of extension services coming 
third (18 per cent) and high costs of hired labour being fourth (12 per cent). 
2.6 Credit 
Although credit is important for all agricultural activities, it is especially 
so for colon os who have to start from scratch. To have no credit prior to the 
initial harvest means that either savings must be available and/or that cash 
income be obtained through wage labour. In Nueva Jerusalen 38 per cent 
of the settlers had capital at the time they arrived. Half of these acq'uired 
it by saving, while the rest used the proceeds from the sale of their previous 
holding as initial capital. None of those interviewed received any loans upon 
arrival, either from official agencies or from middlemen. 
Of the colon os who later received credit, only 38 per cent received 
bank credit, while 76 per cent took credit from middlemen. Of those who 
obtained bank credit, 6 per cent acquired investment credit, the majority 
receiving it for maize production. 
Credit from merchants is given mainly by those dealing in coffee, 
to whom the smaller farmers in particular were indebted before the rise in 
coffee prices in the 1970s altered the situation. 
Thirty per cent of the small farms had initial capital available, as 
did 39 per cent ofthe 26-50 ha farms, 40per cent of the 51-100 ha farms, and 
all of the largest holdings. Institutional production credit was made 
available at least once to 40 per cent of smaller farms, 17 per cent of 26-50 
ha farms, 40 per cent of the 51-100 ha farms and, again, all of the largest 
farms, although this last figure is not statistically significant. Only six per 
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cent of the settlers received institutional production credit more than once 
and none obtained it more than three times. Thecolonos complained that 
_acquiringcreditwas_acumbersome process, involving numerous trips-to 
the bank in Quininde. 
2.7 Commercialization of Produce 
The main cash crops in the area are cocoa, coffee and palm oil. The last is 
entirely in the hands ofthe plantation mentioned before and is not discussed 
here. 
Before addressing ourselves to the issue of commercialization we 
may note that hypothesis iv. was not refuted by the data for farms of less 
than 50 ha, the standard deviations for larger farms being too large to derive 
any meaningful conclusions. In other words, for smaller farms the level of 
output increased as the number oflabour units available to the household 
increased. -
Buyers and channels of commercialization are the same for coffee 
and cocoa. The buyers can be classified as local assemblers, zonal 
assemblers, assemblers/processors and exporters (although there are no 
exporters in Quininde). Three channels exist: (i) producer -local assembler 
- zonal assembler - exporter; (ii) producer - zonal assembler - exporter; (iii) 
producer - assembler/processor - exporter. The first of these three is the 
most common and accounts for about 80 per cent of the produce of the area 
of Quininde and 95 per cent of the produce from Nueva Jerusalen. 
About a dozen local assemblers are located in the Quininde area, 
depending on the season. Some of them are general store holders in 
Quininde or elsewhere, and some set up shop temporarily. A third group 
works mainly as transporters within the canton of Quininde, preparing 
commercial loads of produce for transport assemblers. Transportation to 
the local assembly points usually takes place on Friday night or Saturday 
morning and can be onerous for settlers in distant holdings. The cost of 
transport may vary from 10 sucres per quintal (from Nueva Jerusalen) to 
40 sucres per quintal from the most distant areas, whence mules, canoes and 
vehicles have to be used in sequence. Only in times of great demand (for 
example in 1977) will middlemen enter the production areas and buy at the 
farm gate. 
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Export prices are fixed by the central government, based on inter-
national prices. These constitute the minimum export prices. Since this 
price is the basis for export taxes and for buying from producers, exporters 
have an interest in keeping it as low as possible. The minimum export price 
is taken as an indicator for the production areas. For coffee the local 
assemblerreceives 25 per cent ofthis price per quintal of green coffee. The 
producer receives this amount minus the margin taken by the local 
assembler. It is generally said by perople in the area that the merchants are 
given to dishonest weighing practices, with the margin increasing 
accordingly. Hence, coffee producers hardly ever receive more than 20 per 
cent ofthe minimum export price, while cocoa producers (cocoa is dried 
by the producers) receive about 60 per cent. 
According to data from the Quininde government project, for cof-
fee the local assembler takes on the average an 18 per cent margin, the zonal 
assembler 13 per cent and the exporter 16 per cent, while in the case of cocoa 
the percentages are 10, 11.5 and 18.5 respectively. In view of the fact that 
producers must carry the cost oftransport, it is worthwhile to note that from 
the price they obtain from the local assemblers they must subtract from 3 
to 10 per cent for coffee and from 0.5 to 3 per cent for cocoa to arrive at the 
farm gate price. 
The value of sales given in Tables 2.5 and 2.6 represent 95 per cent 
of the produce marketed by the farmers of Nueva Jerusalen. The price 
variations indicated in the tables reflect seasonal differences and variations 
in quality, amount sold, international prices and the day of transaction. If 
the average price for coffee obtained from local assemblers for the 1979/80 
harvest is estimated at 470 sucres per quintal, the average gross value of 
production per hectare would be 21,700 sucres. At the time of the survey 
production costs per hectare averaged 11 ,300 sucres. 
With 46.1 quintals per hectare produced, transport cost per hectare 
amounts to 461 sucres (10 sucres per quintal). Hence net production value 
in Nueva J erusaIen for coffee would be 9,940 sucres per hectare or 216 sucres 
per quintal. Gross profit per quintal of coffee would therefore be 470- 216 
= 254 sucres per quintal. 
For cocoa, gross profit per quintal amounts to 720 sucres. Produ-
cers generally do not store their produce: 91 per cent sell their weekly harvest 
each weekend. The settlers of Nueva Jerusalen mainly use public transport 
to travel to Quininde. Almost half complain about price levels, about which 
all are well informed. At the time of the survey, the Quininde project staff 
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Table 2.5 
Value of coffee production in Nueva Jerusalen by size of holding, 1979180 
Size of No. of 0/0 Growers Average Price I Value of Produce2 Production 
holding growers Selling min. max. min. max. Value per 
(ha) Hectare) 
~ 25 10 90 390 560 783 1123 20.1 
26- 50 18 83 380 530 930 1287 22.7 
51 -100 5 100 370 560 346 520 25.5 
>100 1 100 350 570 88 144 16.6 
All holdings 34 88 380 550 2147 3074 21.7 
Notes: I in sucres per quintal 
2 in thousands of sucres 
N ) in thousands of sucres, taking the average price. 
0\ 
Table 2.6 
Value of cocoa production in Nueva Jerusalen by size of holding, 1979180 
Size of No. of 0J0 Growers Average Price I Value ofProduce2 Production 
holding growers Selling min. max. min. max. Value per 
(ha) Hectare) 
<25 10 80 1800 2200 576 729 22.9 
26- 50 18 94 1600 2400 1842 2768 20.3 
51-100 5 100 1500 2300 368 577 13.9 
>100 1 100 1300 2500 160 308 11.4 
All holdings 34 91 1600 2300 2946 4382 18.7 
Notes: I in sucres per quintal 
2 in thousands of sucres 
) in thousands of sucres, taking the average price. 
was involved in an attempt to market the produce of the settlers through 
their cooperative. 
2.8 Problems in the Settlement 
Asked whether their personal situation had changed since their arrival 24 
per cent of the settlers answered that it had improved considerably; 73 per 
cent said that it had improved only moderately, while 3 per cent did not 
answer. All wanted to bring more land into cultivation: 91 per cent for 
agriculture and 61 per cent for cattle ranching. More than 97 per cent of the 
settlers were members of the cooperative while 85 per cent had a favourable 
opinion about the usefulness of social organization. 
Asked about the main problems they encountered upon arrival, 
41 per cent of the calaDas answered that the lack of roads was a great 
hindrance; 29 per cent mentioned the lack of cash income, while 21 per cent 
referred to diseases, such as malaria. Only 6 per cent had encountered no 
serious problems; these were aBlate arrivals. 
2.9 Main Conclusions 
ColaDos in Nueva Jerusalen are mostly pioneers who have had very little 
assistance from the government. From the beginning to the present, they 
have had to cope with serious transport problems and almost no investment 
credit. Only a minority has been able to acquire institutional production 
credit. Most credit is provided by coffee and cocoa merchants and most 
settlers specialize in coffee and cocoa. In 1980 more than half of the 
available land had not been cleared or brought into production. 
The settlers appear to have a labour surplus because so many heads 
of households work outside the farm. However, this actually points to a 
cash-income problem, and is perhaps also related to the level of technology 
used. More intensive farming practices could bring presently uncultivated 
land and unutilized labour into production if more modern equipment and 
industrial inputs were available. For this to happen, credit facilities in 
connection with extension services would have to be improved considerably. 
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Incorporation into the Ecuadorian economy takes place largely via 
the middlemen for cocoa and coffee. Producers are generally on the weaker 
side ofthe market, although the gross margins taken by assemblers are fairly 
modest. Once produce has left the area, margins become quite high. 
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3. THECASEOFCAQUETA 
3.1 Background 
New land settlement in Colombia takes place in thedepartamentos of Meta, 
Boyaca, Casanare and Auraca and the Intendencia del Caqueta - which 
are located in the Amazon Basin - in theDepartamento of Antioquia (Gulf 
of Uruba) and in those of Cauca and Choco, on the Pacific Coast. In 
Caqueta, altitude varies between 300 and 500 m, the average animal 
temperature is between 24 and 28 degrees c., and rainfall ranges from 3,000 
to 3,500 mm. Thus originally, Caqueta was occupied by tropical rain forest. 
Soils are in general poor, about 90 per cent of them suitable for grass and 
African oil palm, the remainder for rubber, maize and paddy. 
The Caqueta area started to be opened up at the beginning of this 
century in response to the rubber boom. In that period also, what is now 
the main city, Florencia, was founded (see Map 3). After the end of the 
rubber boom, settlers from the Andes continued to flow to the area, without 
there being much attention paid to them by the authorities. After the 
Instituto de ParceJaciones, Colonizaciones y Defensa Forestal was created 
in 1948 its functions were taken over by the Instituto de Colonizaciones e 
Inmigraciones in 1953. 
By the end of the 1940s, serious problems arose in Colombia that 
were closely related to the land tenure system and in a large part of the 
country armed conflicts took place, which lasted till the early sixties. This 
period, referred to in Colombia as la Violencia, fostered an agreement 
between the Caja de Credito Agrario, the government bank for agriculture 
and the Officina de Rehabilitacion (the Reconstruction Office), a 
government body in charge of solving economic problems related to la 
Violencia. It led to the selection of six zones in Caqueta, where directed 
settlement would take place. Initially three zones were identified: La Mono, 
60 km southeast of Florencia; Maguare, 85 km north of Florencia, and 
Valparaiso, some 70 km east of Florencia and southwest of la Mono (see 
Map 4). In 1963 the responsibility for these three zones was transferred to 
the Instituto Colombian 0 de Reforma Agraria (INCORA), which remains 
in charge of land settlement and land reform. The transfer implied a 
reorientation from directed to semi-directed settlement as defined by 
Nelson (1973), and in 1964Caqueta Project I was created, mainly consisting 
of a programme of investment in roads, health and educational facilities, 
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Map 3: Location of the study area 
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ofland titling and of supervised credit. In 1971 the World Bank provided 
a loan for Caqueta Project II, which was being completed (and a new loan 
was being negotiated) at the time of the survey in 1980. 
The population ofthe Caqueta area had a 7.6 per cent overall annual 
growth rate in the period 1964-1972, the 1964 population being close to 
100,000. The 1980 popUlation was estimated to be about 320,000. 
Florencia's 1980 population of 50,000 was growing rapidly, as the only place 
irt the area with road connections to other parts of the country. Secondary 
centres in Caqueta are Doncello, Morelia, Belen, Puerto Rico, Montanita 
and San Vicente, each having between two and eight thousand inhabitants. 
One aspect of the general economic situation and the distribution 
of income in Caquetaisclarified by Gomez et al. (1977). They provide data 
on houshold income in cash in the region, based on a representative sample 
survey. They found that in 1976, 20.3 per cent ofthe households had no cash 
income and thus were pure subsistence farmers. For 41.3 per cent of the 
households, cash income was less than 40,000 pesos per year. Net cash 
incomes of 40-80,000 pesos were earned by 19.6percent, while 18.8 percent 
earned more than 80,000 pesos per year. Gomez shows that 69 per cent of 
the households had a net income below the average of 45 ,217. 
The (1980) surveys reported on in this study refer to the central areas 
of Valparaiso and Maguare, where 17 and 85 per cent respectively of the 
holders were involved in the directed settlement efforts begun in the early 
1960s. 
3.2 Settler Characteristics 
In Valparaiso, 65 per cent of the settlers were born in the mountainous 
sections of Huila (43) and Tolima (22), while 22 IYercent have come from 
other parts of Caqueta. In Maguare, 76 per cent originate in Tolima (34), 
Antioquia (23) and Caldas (19), while only 4 per cent are internal migrants. 
These 1980 percentages for Valparaiso and Maguare are rather different 
from those found for Caqueta as a whole in 1972 and 1977. In 1972 
(INCORA, 1972), the main origins of settlers in the entire area were (in 
percentages): Huila (30.2), Tolima (21.3) and Antioquia/Caldas (12.0), 
whilein 1977 (Gomezetal., 1977) they were Tolima(22.5), Huila(19.0) and 
Caqueta (19.0). These differences indicate increasing internal movements, 
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but they may also indicate that people arriving from a given department 
tend to arrive at the same destination, a phenomenon often noted in 
migration studies. Ofthe settlers in Valparaiso 61 per cent had owned a farm 
before, and of these 71 per cent had come from another farm in Caqueta. 
Almost 22 percent had worked in ornear Caqueta as farmhands, while 17 
per cent had pursued other occupations. In Maguare only 28 per cent ofthe 
colon os had owned a farm before, and of these 10 per cent came from 
another farm in Caqueta. More than 42 per cent worked as jornaleros 
before acquiring their new land, and 15 per cent of the settlers came from 
other occupations. Hence, on the average, colon os in Valparaiso had more 
farm management experience than those in Maguare. 
The data for Valparaiso support the earlier impression of high de-
gree of mobility among settlers, but in Maguare mobility is considerably 
lower. 
In Valparaiso 70 per cent of the settlers had initial capital, in Ma-
guare only 38 per cent did. In Valparaiso the source of initial capital was 
generally the sale of a previous farm - 83 per cent of the farms in Valparaiso 
were purchased, and of these, more than half were paid for by farmers who 
used their previous farm as payment. In Maguare, where 62 per cent were 
buyers, about half ofthem had arrived with capital exceeding halfthe value 
of the farm they bought. 
3.3 The Holdings 
The Valparaiso settlers surveyed have their holdings along the three roads 
that converge in the town. In order to compare the survey data with previous 
studies of settlers who arrived under the government-sponsored program-
mes at the end of the 1950s and early 1960s, the holdings surveyed are all 
within ten km of Valparaiso. For Maguare, sample selection was based on 
the same principle. This means that holdings located away from the roads 
are not included. 
In general, the plots are rectangular and front on a dirt road. These 
roads are parallel, so that the ends of two plots meet. The dirt roads lead 
to main roads, and since these roads are also in general part ofthe system, 
some settlers have their land on the main roads. In Valparaiso there are more 
rivers and rivulets than in Maguare. 
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Table 3.1 
Distribution of holdings by size, Caquetli, 1980 
Size Valparaiso Maguare 
I 
Holding No.of Total Average per No.of Total Average per 
(ha) Holdings Area Holding Holdings Area l10lding 
Abs. 0/0 Abs. % Abs. % Abs. % 
~ 49 2 9 60 2 30 2 8 80 3 40 
50- 99 10 43 694 25 69 17 65 1211 40 I 71 
100 -199 8 35 1057 37 132 4 15 541 18 ' 135 
200-299 2 9 420 15 210 2 8 400 13 200 
~3oo 1 4 600 21 600 4 800 26 800 
w All holdings 23 100 2831 100 123* 26 100 3032 100 17* 
.jI:.. 
* Excluding the largefarms, the average holding would be 103 hectares in Valparaiso and 89 in Maguare. 
Table 3.1 indicates the distribution of holdings by size in the two 
settlements. In both Valparaiso and Maguare the majority of the holdings 
are between 50 and 200 hectares. Castellanos (1970) provides data on the 
distribution ofland in 1968 and our 1980 data has beenrearranged to enable 
a comparison (see Table 3.2). Consolidation in Valparaiso between 1968 
and 1980 meant that the percentage of farms in the 51-100 ha range 
decreased in favour oflarger holdings. In Maguare consolidation into farms 
over 100 ha (but especially over 150 ha) has been entirely at the expense of 
the farms in the 26-50 ha range. Consolidation is necessarily linked to 
mobility, and thus a third indicator of this aspect of the settlement process 
is identified. 
Size of 
Holding (ha) 
s; 25 
26- 50 
51-100 
101-150 
> 150 
All holdings 
Table 3.2 
Distribution of holdings by size, Caquetli, 1986 and 1980 
(percentages of number of farms) 
Valparaiso Maguare 
1968* 1980 1968* 
0 4.3 0 
13.1 13.1 20.0 
45.6 34.8 63.3 
28.3 30.4 6.7 
13.0 17.4 10.0 
100.0 100.0 100.0 
* from Castallanos, 1970 
1980 
0 
7.7 
69.2 
7.7 
15.4 
100.0 
In Maguare almost 27 per cent of the holdings are occupied by pio-
neer settlers. Another 38.4 per cent bought their holding from a pioneer. 
Some 23.1 per cent bought from a non-pioneer, and U.s per cent did not 
know whether or not the seller had been a pioneer. In Valparaiso only nine 
per cent of the holdings are occupied by pioneer settlers. While 39.1 per cent 
bought their holding from a pioneer, 43.5 per cent bought from a non-
pioneer and the remainder did not know the status of the seller. The turnover 
rate in Valparaiso is fairly high: 43.5 per cent have had their farms for less than 
four years (Maguare: 15.5 per cent), 8.7 per cent for between four and eight 
years (Maguare: 11.5 per cent), and 34.8 per cent for between eight and fifteen 
years (Maguare 61.5 per cent). 
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Apparently, the size of a viable family farm in Valparaiso is well 
over 100ha, while in MaguarHarms of57-100 ha seem viable. Thus, since 
thelegal.size ofpioneecploJsjnthe Caquetar.egion.was50.ha, a process .of 
consolidation started rather quickly, and by 1968 four clearly distin-
guishable farm size classes had emerged in the two settlements surveyed. 
This process continued in Valparaiso, where subdivisions took place, and 
in Maguare. The possibility that the difference in viable farm size between 
the two settlements may be related to a slight difference in demand is 
discussed later in this paper (in Valparaiso the main 'cash crop' is beef, in 
Maguare milk is also marketable). The subdivisions must have taken place, 
since this is the only explanation for plots of less than 30 ha. The reasons 
behind the phenomenon include the settlers' needs for cash, or problems 
of access (e.g. impassable rivers). In some cases patches of rather fertile land 
may have made subdivision possible. 
Table 3.3. shows that most of the land in both zones has been con-
verted into pasture, and Table 3.4 that cattle ranching is the main 
specialization. It is interesting to note that while no less than 26 per cent of 
the fincas (properties) in Valparaiso were worked byadministradores 
(managers), only four per cent in Maguare were. In both areas these are the 
main employers of permanent farmhands. 
Land Use 
Crops 
Pasture 
Bush/Fallow 
Not cleared 
TOTAL 
Farm type 
Cattle ranching 
Crops 
Mixed 
Subsistence 
TOTAL 
Table 3.3 
Percentage distribution of land use, 1980 
Valparaiso Maguare 
(percentages of total area in holdings) 
Table 3.4 
6.3 
69.5 
14.1 
10.1 
100.0 
Number of farms by farm type, 1980 
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Valparaiso 
No. 070 
13 
4 
5 
1 
23 
57 
17 
22 
4 
100 
2.7 
71.1 
11.6 
14.6 
100.0 
Maguare 
No. 0J0 
17 
1 
6 
2 
26 
65 
4 
23 
8 
100 
Looking at the data by farm size (Table 3.5), we find that in Valpa-
raiso, farmers with 50-99 ha are relatively more interested in producing 
crops than their counterparts in Maguare, although it is clear that all are 
basically aiming at cattle breeding. The table also shows that clearing has 
progressed further in Maguare than in Valparaiso. 
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3.4 Labour 
In both areas, permanent wage labour is rather rare, with families providing 
most of the needed labour. Table 3.6 gives the average number of full time 
equivalent labour days for owners who live on their holding. 
Valparaiso 
Maguare 
Table 3.6 
A 'fernge number of labour days per family by size of holding, 1980 
<50 
1.25 
2.5 
Size of holding in hectares 
50-99 100-199 200-299 
1.7 
2.8 
1.9 
2.25 
2 
4 
>300 
1.5 
3 
Families in both areas are generally large, averaging 7.2 members in 
Maguare and 6.45 in Valparaiso. Temporary labour is used by many, but 
generally for only a very few days each year. The Maguare settlers 
consistently have more labour available than those in Valparaiso, at least 
in part because families are slightly larger and the average age of the children 
is higher. This may partly explain why more land has been cleared on the 
smaller farms in Maguare, but given the data in Tables 3.1,3.5 and 3.6, it 
is clear that the land is quite extensively used in both settlements. 
3.5 Level of Tecbnology 
Valparaiso and Maguare settlers have the same rather rudimentary level of 
technology. They generally use no more thanhachas (hatchets), machetes 
and paJas (wooden shovels), and sprayers that can be fastened to their backs. 
Data on inputs used by the settlers are not sufficient to give a 
quantified result. 
3.6 Credit 
Institutional credit in Caquetais provided by INCORA, the CajaAgraria, 
the Banco Ganadero, and the Cooperative. Since 1963, INCO RA has been 
38 
experimenting with various types of credit for Caja Agraria settlements. 
They took over the settling-down credits provided by the Caja, consolidat-
ing the outstanding debts of the settlers at a great loss to INCORA. 
According to an official report on this action, (lNCO RA-II CA, 1974), the 
main causes for the original failure were: (a) the very poor infrastructure 
in the area forced settlers to use the loans for non-production purposes, such 
as transportation, housing and subsistence; (b) the fact that interest was 
discounted in advance, diminishing the amount available for investment; 
(c) low yields, just sufficient for subsistence; (d) poor matching of soils to 
the crop for which credit was given (studies were made only afterwards); (e) 
poor organization of the settlements and of food distribution; and finally 
(f) a poor procedure for the selection of colonos. 
INCORA's second experience was similar. From 1962 to 1965 
INCORA provided supervised credit, again with capitalized interest. This 
programme was mainly directed at cattle ranchers and its maj or problems 
were that settlers did not have as yet the experience required; that the quality 
ofthe cattle arriving in the area was low; thatthere was no grace period; and 
that cattle prices paid to settlers were much lower than expected due to high 
transportation costs (INCORA-IICA, 1974). 
At the time of our 1980 survey INCORA operated a supervised credit 
programme, combining production planning and extension services with 
credit and supervision. Loans within this programme could be used for 
cattle ranching, for the production of maize and rice and for the 
construction of dwellings. The loans were administered by the Caj a Agraria 
and the Banco Ganadero. Terms of payment were one year for cash crops, 
two to seven years for cattle ranchers and 10-15 years for permanent farm 
infrastructure and perennial crops. Since 1972 the rate of interest has been 
10 per cent plus one per cent for insurance. 
This background information leads us to Table 3.7 which provides 
data on credit used by settlers in the two areas under study. 
The reasons for differences between the two zones are not 
immediately evident. First of all, it must be borne in mind that in Valparaiso 
there are hardly any pioneers left. Most owners there bought their land and 
70 per cent of the owners surveyed had initial capital. Therefore, they had 
less need for long term credit than the people in Maguare, where only 38 per 
cent reported having had initial capital. Secondly, as pioneers, the farmers 
in Maguare were more eligible for long term credit than were farmers in 
Valparaiso. 
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Table3.7 
Use of Institutional Credit Dver the Period 1960-1980 
(per cent of settlers per size class) 
Farm Size 
(ha) 
Long term credit Medium and short term credit 
<50 
50- 99 
100-199 
200-299 
>299 
TOTAL* 
Valparaiso Maguare 
20 
75 
35 
50 
65 
50 
50 
58 
* percentages of all settlers surveyed. 
Valparaiso 
70 
63 
100 
100 
65 
Maguare 
100 
82 
50 
100 
73 
Pioneer status, possession of initial capital (and also the titles 
owners hold) seem less important in relation to medium- and short-term 
credit, since in this regard, conditions in the two areas are basically similar 
(In Valparaiso 83 per cent had title, in Maguare 73 per cent*). Differences 
might then be due to a difference in attitude of administrators in charge 
of the two areas or to other factors. 
Most settlers are poorly informed about the various modalities of 
credit available to them. Often they don't even know the exact nature of 
the credit they have obtained. They are also unaware of the INCORA 
programme as distinct from the normal credit available from the Caja and 
the Banco Ganadero. 
The need for additional credit does not appear to be extremely high 
in view of the fact that only 18 per cent of the farmers in both areas used 
credit from non-institutional sources such as friends, family or merchants. 
They have also devised a system of aJ partir, in which farmers pasture their 
cattle on another farmer' land, and in return for the grass and some care 
of the animals, the landowning partner receives half the increase in value. 
This system was used by 26 per cent of the settlers in Valparaiso and by 54 
per cent of those in Maguare. However, these systems may have developed 
in response to deficiencis in the available banking services. 
* In Maguare people without title received credit, as long as the cattle they bought 
with it was used as collateral. 
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3.7 Extension Services 
In Valparaiso 74 per cent of the colon os received some form of assistance 
from IN CO RA. In Maguare only half did. A few follow courses (5 and 21 
per cent respectively) and the visits of extension officers are considered to 
be the most important channel for transfer of knowledge (62 and 35 per cent 
respectively). However, 29per cent of the settlers in Valparaiso and 22 per 
cent of those in Maguare complained that extension officers lacked 
experience. 
3.8 Commercialization 
Valparaiso markets 56 per cent of its crops, Maguare only 30 per cent. Yields 
are not high: 0.7 tonnes per hectare for rice and 0.5 tonnes per hectare for 
maize. Producers in the area of Valparaiso sell maize to three types of 
buyers: wholesalers in Florencia, local assemblers who come to the farm 
gate and local merchants who in turn sell to wholesalers in Florencia. In 
Maguare the system is slightly more complex because the government 
buying agency IDEMA operates there, but it receives no more than 15 per 
cent oftotal output.* 
Rice is only of importance in Valparaiso, where 26 per cent of the 
farmers grow it. Total output by these farmers was 18 tonnes of which 15 
were marketed. The organization of the market is equal to that for maize, 
although in this case wholesalers in Florencia occupy a more important 
position, taking 60 per cent of the market. Commercialization margins for 
rice in the area are about 10 per cent of the IDEMA support price. 
In 1980 the IDEM A support price (payable by cheque) was 9,620 
pesos per tonne. Valparaiso farmers selling directly to ID EMA, would have 
to pay about 100 pesos per tonne to get the maize to Valparaiso and an 
additional 800 to have it brought from there to Florencia, where IDEMA 
buys. Thus farmers would receive 8,720 pesos per tonne. This compares to 
6,400 pesos an assembler would pay in cash at the farm gate. In order to turn 
a cheque into cash, the farmer would have to make at least one additional 
trip to Florencia - at a cost of about 2,000 pesos - while losing one labour 
day, valued at 300 pesos (if a temporary labourer were to be hired in 
replacement). Thus, the farmer would have a net receipt of 8,200 pesos per 
* For Caqueta as a whole IDEMA bought about 20 per cent of the total supply. 
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tonne if marketing a single tonne. Wholesalers were buying at Florencia at 
8.660 pesos per tonne, or 960 pesos below the support price, but paying in 
cash. Thus, for the assembler selling to IDEMA the gross margin would be 
(9,620-6,400)/9,620 or approximately one third of the support price, 
while he could sell the same quantity to wholesalers with a gross margin of 
(8,660 - 6,400)/9,600 or 23 per cent of the support price. 
Cattle ranching provides two types of output: cattle and milk. Milk 
production is encouraged by CICOLAC (CompaiIia Industrial 
Colombiana de La.cteos), a private dairy firm located in Florencia. 
Seventy-eight per cent ofthe cattle in Caqueta are American Cebu 
(Brahman), the remainder being Creole (21 per cent) or Holstein, Brown 
Swiss or other breeds. Wiezer (1967) found that at the end of 1966 the 
average holding owned eleven head of cattle, or 0.57 head per hectare. 
In Valparaiso and Maguare, cattle ranching started some years later 
than in areas like La Mono and Florencia. By 1969, however, the average 
number of cattle on a farm had reached 27.9 per cent of the overall Caqueta 
figure in Valp~raiso, and 32.0 per cent in Maguare (Castellanos, 1970). 
Many of the animals are held in joint ownership and respondents 
had great difficulty in answering questions related to this aspect of their 
situation. With the aid of INCORA officials it was possible, however, to 
estimate that 60 per cent of the herd in both areas belongs to individual 
colonos* while 40 per cent is held in a profit-sharing arrangement with 
partners**. These compafifas or arrangements are composed as follows: 
60 per cent are with individual partners; 35 per cent withFondos Ganaderos 
(from Huila or Caqueta) and five per cent with the Cooperativa Agraria 
del Caqueta. In the first case, the share is 50-50, in the others it is 65 per cent 
for the colon os and 35 per cent for the Fondo or Cooperativa. The 
arrangement consists in the raising and fattening of cattle after an initial 
estimate of their value. After one or two years, the cattle are sold and the 
profits (determined as sales price minus initial value) are shared out. 
In view of the difficulties encountered in the survey on the matter 
of cattle ownership, the data provided below refer to only 13 holdings in 
Valparaiso and 18 in Maguare. 
* In a great number of cases, bought after loans were acquired. 
** In 1969 Castellenos (1970) found virtually the same percentages. 
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Survey totals by area are: 2,259 for Valparaiso and 1,520 for 
Maguare, bringing the averages per holding to 125.5 for Valparaiso and 66.1 
for Maguare. 
Animal husbandry practices are rather rudimentary, and although 
all farmers provide salts and minerals, only half use vaccines. 
In Valparaiso there were 1.12 heads per hectare in 1980, which is 
considered the upper limit for the area. The Maguare figure is 0.7 so that 
TabJeJ.8 
Cattle inventory, 1980 
Type of Valparaiso Maguare 
Cattle Heads Heads per Heads Heads per 
abs. oro holding abs. % holding 
Cows 
(producing) 988 52.2 76.6 379 41.9 21.1 
Cows (dry) 159 8.4 12.2 202 22.3 11.2 
Heifers 313 16.5 24.1 176 19.5 9.8 
Calves 274 14.5 21.5 75 8.3' 4.2 
Steers 118 6.2 9.1 56 6.2 3.1 
Bulls 41 2.2 3.2 16 1.8 0.9 
TOTAL 1893 100.0 146.7 904 100.0 50.3 
the herd could theoretically increase. The composition of the herd in 
Valparaiso shows either fairly low birth or fertility rates and/or a tendency 
to sell animals at an early stage, the latter possibly indicating a high need 
for cash. This tendency is even more pronounced in Maguare where calves 
and steers together are only 14.5 per cent of the herd. 
The regional branch of the cattle owners association (the Comite 
de Ganaderos) affiliated with the Federaci6n Nacional de Ganaderos 
estimated that the Caqueta herd totalled 1,000,000 head. The Comite 
estimates that in 1979 about 65,000 head were exported to other parts of 
the country, about 85 per cent of these to the city of Cali. Internal 
consumption in Caqueta thus accounts for about 30,000 animals. Cattle 
is exported on the hoof, and 90 per cent of such sales involve young animals. 
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Cali, the most important city in Southern Colombia, is located 
about 500 km from Florencia, across the Andes. The buyer.s from Cali 
dominate the Caqueta market and they have set up a monopsonistic 
structure of brokers or despachadores who control prices and quantities 
in accordance with demand in Cali. They buy directly from large farmers 
and from brokers acting for the small and middle-size farms. A few of the 
dozen most important buyers have farms of their own. 
Prices for the internal Caqueta market are considerably higher, 
and traders selling locally are much more numerous. The quality is lower, 
and locally sold animals are normally old or infertile cows or animals 
that have suffered accidents. 
The marketing of cattle in Caqueta is hindered considerably by 
transport problems. This affects coloDos in the area both when they buy 
and when they sell. Imported cattle are expensive not only because of direct 
transport costs, but also because of weight loss and accidents. Trucks used 
for exporting steers have a capacity of 10 fattened animals, but cattle leaving 
Florencia are generally below the optimum weight of 450-460 kg, so the 
freight/weight ratio is too high. In addition, each animal will lose about 30 
kg during the trip. Still, the freight per animal is 1,400 to 1,600 pesos from 
Florencia, while the cost to bring it there from the farm is about 400 pesos. 
Transportation contracts are normally made by private agencies that act 
as brokers. They assign freight to drivers who generally own the trucks they 
drive. Truck owners are nominally organized in cooperatives since in this 
way they can obtain a truck free of import duty. However, once they have 
their trucks they operate on an individual basis. Tariffs are set by time period 
on the basis of agreements with users of the service. 
The marketing of cattle in the two areas surveyed follows the 
general pattern already described. Eight per cent of the 1979 Valparaiso 
herd was sold: 14 per cent of all female calves, 24 percent of all male calves, 
and 17 per cent of the grown bulls. From a herd management point of view 
these figures are surprising, since one would expect more young bulls to have 
been marketed. However, in view of our earlier observations in connection 
with animal husbandry and the composition ofthe herd, other factors seem 
to be at work. 
Local middlemen bought 66 per cent of the adult animals that were 
sold, brokers in Florencia bought 19 per cent and the remainder were bought 
by local settlers. The coloDos generally received 27-30 pesos per kg live 
weight, the average weight being 300 kg. In Florencia the price was 33-35 
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pesos per kg, but most colon os in Valparaiso would not get the additional 
1,050-1,550pesos per head: only 12 per cent of the Valparaiso farmers sold 
their adult animals in Florencia, mainly because the Florencia market is not 
organized for small operations and transportation is scarce. 
Young, fattened animals for export would fetch 37 pesos/kg in 
Valparaiso and 47 pesos/kg in Florencia, but again, most Valparaiso 
farmers sell in Valparaiso. The problem here is basically the same as that 
in the Caqueta market, further aggravated by the strong position of the 
despachadores. Settlers will not risk taking their fattened cattle to Florencia 
without having arranged the sale beforehand with a broker, for otherwise 
they would probably be unable to sell it. Previous arrangements include 
visual inspection of the cattle by the broker's personnel on the farm and 
agreeing to the price offered. Payments are normally made by cheque 
payable in 30 days. Thus, the colona is forced to finance the market 
operations of the despachadores. 
At the time of the survey, in the main market of destination, Cali, 
fattened cattle from Caqueta brought 55 pesos/kg. The gross margin for 
thedespachadores, calculated as the cost of an animal in Valparaiso (425 
x $37 = $15,725) plus $450 for transport to Florencia and $1,500 for 
transport to Cali, a total cost of putting a fattened young bull in Cali is 
therefore $17,675. Assuming 30 kg of weight loss, the despachador will 
receive 395 x $55 or $21,725 per head. The gross margin is, therefore $4,050 
or 18.6 per cent ofthe Cali price, of which one point should be reserved for 
losses due to accidents. 
In Maguare eleven per cent of the herd is sold each year, and the 
tendency to sell young animals is even more pronounced: 37 per cent of 
heifer calves and 22 per cent of bull calves are sold each year. Marketing 
channels are much the same as in Valparaiso, although a much higher 
percentage (about double) of cattle is sold to other settlers. The middlemen 
are located not in Maguareitselfbut about 15 km away in Doncello, which 
has a very good road connection to Florencia. No Maguare farmer sells 
directly in Florencia, and prices in Maguare are quite similar to those in the 
Valparaiso area. 
Milk production for the market is becoming important in Maguare: 
no fewer than 73 per cent of the respondents were selling to CICOLAC. 
Until 1977, and especially in the two areas surveyed, milk was used for 
consumption at home only. Some cuajada ( cheese) was made and sold to 
local merchants. In that year, however, CICOLAC, which is linked to 
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Nestle, started operations in Florencia. It buys milk directly from the 
producers at $10 per litre payable twice a month. For this purpose it has 
trucks driving along the all-weather roads in the region. Also it has some 
cooling plants, one of which is in Doncello. INCORA officials estimate that 
every settler located within five km of these roads sells milk to CICOLAC. 
Settlers have a positive attitude towards this company, which also 
provides extension services and sells inputs (salt, minerals, drugs) which 
are delivered at the farm gate. Milk sales provide them with a regular, 
although small, flow of cash which they badly need. 
INCORA officials are less enthusiastic about CICOLAC. They 
argue that livestock ranching is negatively affected, with calves not getting 
enough milk due to excessive milking by the farmers. They also say that 
farmers are becoming dependent on the system, that CI CO LAC is deriving 
too much benefit from the road system built by the government and from 
government loans provided to stimulate livestock production and not milk 
production. 
In 1979 over 3 ,000,000 lit res of pre-condensed milk were purchased 
from local farms. 
3.9 The Personal Situation of Settlers 
Taking the respondents of the two surveys together, 90 per cent of them 
answered that they had a slightly or well improved situation as compared 
to before their arrival at the holding. However, 33 per cent were willing to 
sell and 63 per cent were not. Of those wanting to sell, 38 per cent aspired 
to being a merchant, while 44 per cent would settle again elsewhere. The 
remainder (18 per cent) were not clear as to what they would do. 
Medina (1971: 118) reported that 52 per cent wanted to leave, so 
that in 10 years time a certain change(from 52 per cent to 33 per cent) has 
taken place: more colon os seem to feel that they have reached their des-
tination. 
3.10 Main Conclusions for the Cases of Valparaiso and Maguar.! 
Both settlements are characterized by poor soil conditions, allowing few 
options other than ranching. The crops that are grown occupy a very minor 
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percentage of the land in use and mainly serve the subsistence needs of the 
farmers. . 
In both areas, farmers are trying to establish herds, but most own 
only part of the herd they tend. In view of the low level of technology 
employed, income per holding can increase only as the size of the farm 
increases. This is especially true in Valparaiso, where the number of heads 
per hectare has reached the upper limit. Hence, it can be expected that 
consolidation will continue in Valparaiso. This is supported by the fact that 
approximately one third ofthe settlers would be willing to sell. In Maguare 
the situation seems slightly better, at least in terms of the possibilities for 
herds to increase. 
For most settlers credit remains one of the most important (and 
least available) inputs, especially for those having less than 200 hectares. 
The short term credit that many of them receive is only relevant for their 
subsistence crops and does not help them to build up their herds. 
The smaller settlers are also at a disadvantage in the cattle market. 
They are generally unable to sell in Florencia, and must content themselves 
with 82 to 86 per cent of the Florencia price. This, in turn, is about 81 per 
cent of the Cali price, so the gross margin for marketing cattle from 
Valparaiso and Maguare to Cali is approximately 32 per cent. Incorporation 
into the economy, especially of settlers with holdings below 200 ha, is 
mainly via the product market, since almost no inputs are bought. The 
linkage to the credit system is becoming increasingly important. 
It seems that climate, soil quality and scarcity of credit have 
negatively influenced the duration of stay of settlers. Poor soils, primitive 
technology anbd an adverse climate necessitate the consolidation of 
holdings, because the maintenance and support of a household will require 
a large farm, a reality evidenced by the data on Caqueta farm sizes for the 
period 1968-80 and the 1980 data on technologies in use. Hard data on 
reasons for selling could not be obtained, since sellers leave the area and are 
unavailable for interview; but the sUb-optimal size of the initial plots 
assigned by INCORA is a stimulus for consolidation as long as technology 
levels remain low, output remains insufficient, and the payback 
requirements of loans farmers have taken exceed their ability to pay. An 
indication of the importance of credit is found in the fact that only 61 per 
cent of the settlers in Maguare intend to stay, and less than 12 per cent of 
this group feel they could plan an expansion without relying upon credit. 
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Similarly, of the 77 per cent of the settlers in Valparaiso who plan to stay, 
only 6 per cent say that expansion might be possible without credit. 
The building of herds is accomplished partly through the phenome-
non of thecompafffa, and in both areas about 40 per cent oftlie herd is not 
owned by the colon os. Outside ownership will decrease over time, as long 
as the value of inputs provided by the settlers is lower than the share of the 
profits they obtain. However, without specific data on the value of the 
inputs, it is impossible to predict any trend. 
The markets for subsistence crops in the Caqueta area are obvious-
ly structured against the colon os: middlemen take a high percentage, and 
the market is not structured to accept the small quantities marketed by 
individual settlers. The market for beef cattle to be transported to Cali is 
structured to the advantage of the despachadores, and incorporation into 
the Columbian economy is largely channelled via these brokers. 
48 
4. A COMPARISON OF RESULTS 
In all three settlements the first pioneering step has indeed been the clearing 
of land for subsistence crops. Once these crops were established, the 
settlements diverged: in Nueva Jerusalen no less than 68 per cent of the 
pioneers turned out to be stayers who left more than half of their plots 
unused; in Maguare and Valparaiso the rate ofturnover of settlers was much 
higher, and more differentiation occurred. 
We hypothesized that settlers would tend to stay longer the greater 
the number of family labour units available, the more initial capital 
available, the more technical know-how they possessed and the greater their 
socio-political abilities. 
It was not possible to determine the impact of the last two attri-
butes: no data was gathered on socio-political ability, and information on 
technical know-how is rather sketchy. Nevertheless, we have argued that 
settlers coming from a similar climate are more likely to have the required 
technical know-how than those from other climates, and thus should be 
more successful as 'stayers'. While this cannot be proven by the data, it is 
not refuted. The pioneers of Nueva Jerusalen came mainly from Los Rios, 
a quite similar area, where the main cash crops are also coffee and cocoa. 
In the cases of Valparaiso and Maguare large percentages of the settlers 
came from mountainous areas quite unlike the settlements. According to 
the hypothesis, settlers in Quininde should on average stay longer than those 
in Caqueta, and in fact in Quininde 68 per cent of the settlers are pioneers, 
while the percentage in Caqueta is much lower. 
Of the natural conditions, we have been able to consider soil fer-
tility. Since this is higher in Quininde, we expected the length of stay there 
to be longer than in Caquete, and this is confirmed by the data. In both of 
the Colombian settlements, very few pioneers remained on the plots ofless 
than 50 hectares: none in Valparaiso and only 18 per cent in Maguare. No 
one in either area purchased a farm of fewer than 50 hectares, which implies 
that soil fertility did not permit people to produce an adequate income with 
50 hectares, and that consolidation was necessary. This is borne out by the 
data for the more fertile area, Quininde, where 26 per cent of the pioneers 
had 'small' farms and 40 per cent of the buyers had purchased farms of 
fewer than 25 ha, the legal size size for an initial holding there. 
Table 4.1 summarizes the data on pioneers and initial capital in all 
three settlements. Pioneers are a minority: only 32 families or slightly 
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more than 38 per cent of all settlers interviewed were pioneers: 68 per cent 
in Quininde, nine per cent in Valparaiso, and 27 per cent in Maguare. 
Table 4.1 
Number of pioneers by length of stay and initial capital 
With initial capital Without initial capital 
Length of stay Total 
Area <6 6-10 10-15 >15 <6 6-10 10-15 >15 
Quininde 0 1 4 4 0 0 5 9 23 
Valparaiso I 0 0 0 0 0 I 0 2 
Maguare 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 5 7 
Total 4 6 0 0 6 14 32 
The data on initial capital do not support our hypothesis: it turns 
out that pioneers without initial capital stayed longer in all three cases. 
A possible explanation for this is probably to be found in the way 
the hypothesis was formulated. Obviously, the hypothesis is one of the 
ceteris paribus type, in this case implying that among settlers with otherwise 
equal attributes, those with initial capital will stay longer. This hypothesis 
should be considered in conjunction with the hypothesis regarding family 
labour. 
In view of the rather different man-made and natural conditions in 
Quininde and Caqueta, the importance of the availability oflabour and 
capital must be considered separately for each. (Valparaiso has been 
excluded since only two observations could be made.) For the cases of 
Maguare and Quininde multiple regressions were prepared based on the 
hypothesis that 
Xo = ao + alxl + alx2 + a2x3 
where Xo = stay in plot by pioneer in years; 
XI dummy variable for initial capital: 0 if lacking, and 1 if 
present; 
X2 = number of family labour units available during the first 
four years of residence; 
X3 = size of the plot. 
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For Quininde we found: 
Xo =" 23.05 
(114.818) 
and for Maguare: 
Xo = 15.35 
(10.027) 
- 0.083x, - 4.991x2 
(-0.426) (-40.118) 
- 1.024x, + 0.141x2 
(-0.798) (0.230) 
+ 0.007x) 
(21.394) 
-0.028x) 
(-0.787) 
R2 = 0.997 
R2 = 0.047 
These are so-called adjusted correlation coefficients. The figures in 
brackets below the estimates ofthe regression coefficients are t-values. All 
three regression coefficients for Quininde are significant at the one per cent 
level, but only one for Maguare. The sign for X2 in the case of Quininde is 
not 'correct', but that for x) is, allowing us to at least conclude that plot size 
is an important variable in pioneer decision-making. In the Maguare case, 
only the sign for x2 is correct. How:ever, the t-value is much too low to allow 
a conclusion. Thus, the hypotheses are only marginally supported by the 
data and the search for a better explanation of settler behaviour remains 
important. 
The most important man-made conditions seem to be credit and 
crop selection. Both areas in Caqueta are directed settlements, while 
Esmeraldas is an area of spontaneous settlement. In Caqueta, many settlers 
- ifnot all- received initial credit, and they also received technical assistance 
from INC ORA officials. In Esmeraldas government assistance during the 
first five years amounted to no more than making available the formalities 
required for legal ownership. But then the Caqueta colon os were required 
to plant crops that would not grow in the area (through supervised credit 
for certain crops only) while in Esmeraldas, the settlers were familiar with 
the climate, soil and the production technology that would give results. In 
Caqueta, both settlers and agronomists came from other natural zones 
(mainly the Sierra) and many had initial difficulties with crop production. 
Thus, there was a problem not only with the selection of colon os, but also 
with agricultural engineers and crops. 
Hence, the credit available in Caqueta was not always used well, 
and there were few opportunities to raise cash through wage labour. In 
Quininde, settlers could earn cash as lumberjacks or as seasonal workers 
on the plantations while waiting for their cocoa and coffee trees to bear. 
Thus, the settlers in Quininde could avoid indebtedness, and the issue of 
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legal title turned out to have little relevance to them. For them, the existing 
arrangements with merchants and through their cooperative were sufficient 
to maintain the majority as 'stayers'. 
As hypothesized in section 1.5, the importance of the main crop 
cannot be underemphasized. Credit or anal partir arrangement is almost 
a necessity for a settler in Caqueta, since after two to four years the land can 
be used only for cattle. As a means to establish a stock, the latter arrange-
ment works very slowly, the more so since the need for cash requires the sale 
of some portion of the herd each year, other cash crops being unfeasible in 
any significant quantity. 
Investment credit is only available for people with legal title to their 
land. In Valparaiso therefore, it would seem that credit has been more often 
than not a means for incorporating land - rather than settlers - into the 
economy, While in Maguare, short term credit has been used to keep settlers 
in the area. 
The hypothesis that pioneers would stay longer if their cash crops 
require relatively little investment is not refuted by the data: the investment 
per hectare in coffee and cocoa trees in Quininde is considerably less than 
the per hectare investment in cattle in Caqueta, and in the latter zone settlers 
moved on much faster. This is, however, only a partial relationship and must 
be treated accordingly. 
The hypothesis that the degree of monopsony will be higher the 
greater the investment to be made by assembler/traders, finds no 
confirmation in the data. Competition among these people in all three areas 
appears to be equally fierce if judged by their fairly low gross margins as 
described in sections 2.7 and 3.8. In both Quininde and Caqueta, trade 
margins become large in the next phase, once the produce has left the area. 
Since institutional credit for investment purposes has played a mi-
nor role in the three areas and since institutional production credit was given 
only for minor crops, credit bas not been used as a means to incorporate 
settlers into the national economy. Incorporation takes place only in 
relation to the three cash crops: cattle, cocoa and coffee. The main 
instruments seem to be informal credit and marketing arrangements. Those 
who raise cattle face more difficult marketing conditions than do coffee and 
cocoa growers. Ownership of means of transport appears to playa role in 
all areas. As settlers use almost no inputs, incorporation is not effected 
through this potential link. 
In SUTIlmary, the most important physical differences between 
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Nueva Jerusalen (Quininde) and Valparaiso and Maguare (Caqueta) are 
the size of the farm and the type of production. Whereas in Caqueta the 
average holding is around 100 hectares and the main commercial product 
is beef, the Quininde farms average about 45 hectares and are planted with 
tree crops. These differences seem to be reducible to differences in soil 
quality. 
Farmers in Quininde are less likely to move on than are those in 
Caqueta, presumably because conditions are more favourable for them. 
This also follows from the fact that Quininde settlers have considerably less 
oftheir holdings in prod uction even while using more labour. Nevertheless, 
there are important similarities: in both cases a high percentage of pioneers 
sell their land to later arrivals; credit facilities are scarce; the cash crop is 
capital intensive; the settlements are located far away from their markets; 
technology is primitive; marketing is in the hands of brokers and not 
settlers; and transport facilities are deficient. Another similadty is that the 
majority of all settlers feel that they are better offthan before. 
It follows that settler behaviour is determined more by the natural 
and man-made conditions studied than by individual characteristics or 
attributes. However, this does not mean that settler selection is irrelevant. 
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5. CONCLUSION 
Studies of settler behaviour should explicity distinguish stayers and movers, 
an aspect our study has only begun to address. To do so would require 
closely following a generation of pioneers in a series of settlements, since 
only in long-term studies would it be possible to fully identify the 
characteristics of stayer and mover behaviour and theirrelation to the 
various man-made and natural conditions that could turn an initial stayer 
into an eventual mover. 
Regarding such changes in motivation, this study has generated the 
hypothesis that more stayers will become movers the greater the gap between 
the size of the pioneer plot and the size ofa viable family farm, and the more 
diffIcult it is to obtain investment credit. It foliows that we can also 
hypothesize that the smaller the pioneer plot, the higher the percentage of 
land cleared in a settlement area. 
The impact of the distances between farms, service centres and mar-
kets upon settler behaviour also requires further attention. Again, this can 
only be studied over time, but our hypothesis is that greater distances 
discourage stayers. . 
Finally, more attention should be given to assessing and predicting 
the impact of the various man-made and natural conditions on settler 
behavIour. In addition to being able to say that plots x per cent below the 
size of a viable farm will cause y per cent of pioneers to move, it would be 
useful to be able to assess factors relating to, for instance, cash income and 
health. Income in this sense is not narrowly defined as the value-added 
extracted from the farm, but also encompasses off-farm earnings, since, 
where income can be earned outside the holding, it becomes possible to 
postpone or avoid the selling of a too-small plot. 
From a policy-making point of view, these questions appear to be 
more relevant to the meaningful evaluation of a policy than an analysis in 
terms of desertion rates. Answers to the kind of questions raised here could 
potentially contribute to the creation of better conditions for new land 
settlement. 
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